

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

MICHAEL TOLIVER JORDAN,	)	
ID # 530152,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
vs.	)	No. 3:05-CV-2386-M
	)	
DONNA CONN, et al.,	)	
Defendants.	)	

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION  
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:

**I. BACKGROUND**

On December 2, 2005, the Court received the instant action against Parole Revocation Hearing Officer Donna Conn; Parole Field Officer Justin Alexander; and Parole Board Members, James Kiel, Jr. and Roy Garcia. (See Compl. at 1-2.) Plaintiff's claims relate generally to his parole revocation hearing of October 17, 2001. (See *id.* at 2-3.) He claims that defendants Conn and Alexander "employed unconstitutional cut down procedure(s)" in that hearing and thus denied him his right to due process. (*Id.*) He claims that defendants Kiel and Garcia failed to investigate the unconstitutional revocation proceedings. (*Id.* at 2.) By this lawsuit, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (*Id.* at 3.) No process has been issued in this case.

**II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING**

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed *in forma pauperis*. As a prisoner seeking redress from an employee or officer of a governmental entity, plaintiff's complaint is subject

to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See *Martin v. Scott*, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding *in forma pauperis*, his complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for *sua sponte* dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” *Id.* at 327. Furthermore, a claim that falls under the rule announced in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) “is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.” *Hamilton v. Lyons*, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); *Smith v. Winter*, 782 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1986); *Henrise v. Horvath*, 94 F. Supp. 2d 768, 769 (N.D. Tex. 2000).

### III. SECTION 1983

Plaintiff seeks monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a Parole Revocation Hearing Officer, a Parole Field Officer, and two Parole Board Members related to his October 2001 revocation of parole. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action and affords redress for the “deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” *Livadas v. Bradshaw*, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To

state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See *Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks*, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); *Bass v. Parkwood Hosp.*, 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999).

In this case, plaintiff complains that defendants Conn and Alexander unconstitutionally revoked his parole and defendants Kiel and Garcia failed to investigate such unconstitutional revocation. Under *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), when a successful civil rights action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a plaintiff's conviction or sentence, the complaint must be dismissed, unless plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 512 U.S. at 486-87. This doctrine applies to challenges regarding the fact or duration of parole. *Littles v. Board of Pardons & Paroles Div.*, 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); *Jackson v. Vannoy*, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); *McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles*, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

In this instance, a ruling granting monetary relief on plaintiff's claims against defendants would necessarily implicate the validity of his parole revocation. *Heck* thus requires plaintiff to demonstrate that the revocation has been reversed, invalidated, or overturned prior to bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has provided nothing to indicate that the *Heck* prerequisites have been met. Nothing in his complaint indicates that the revocation has been successfully overturned, reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court in a habeas proceeding. Until plaintiff receives a ruling

declaring his parole revocation invalid, no action will accrue under § 1983 for his current claims. Consequently, plaintiff's complaint has no basis in law and should be dismissed as frivolous. See *Hamilton v. Lyons*, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[a] §1983 claim which falls under the rule in *Heck* is legally frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question").

#### IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the District Court summarily **DISMISS** plaintiff's complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) until such time as plaintiff satisfies the conditions set forth in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Such dismissal will count as a "strike" or "prior occasion" within the meaning 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).<sup>1</sup>

SIGNED this 29th day of June, 2006.

  
IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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<sup>1</sup> Section 1915(g), which is commonly known as the "three-strikes" provision, provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section, if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation on plaintiff by mailing a copy to him. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file and serve written objections within ten days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. *Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (*en banc*).

  
IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE